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Why negotiate when you can criminalise? Lessons for conflict transformation from 
Northern Ireland and South Africa  
 
Abstract1 
Research on negotiating with criminalised actors generally assumes the criminal label as a 
given, neglecting the significance of criminalisation itself. This article addresses this gap 
arguing that the processes of criminalisation and decriminalisation embody important 
incentive structures affecting peace negotiations. Specifically, for conflict transformation to 
effectively occur, criminalisation needs to be orientated away from a criminalisation of actors 
and on to specific acts to legitimise nonviolent political expression and negotiations. These 
arguments will be advanced through a comparative study of Northern Ireland and South 
Africa, adopting a conflict transformation framework, and drawing on sixty-three original 
interviews and archival material. 
 




Research on negotiating with the criminalised has predominantly accepted the criminal or 
terrorist label as a given even whilst the problems of definition and heterogeneity are 
acknowledged.1 However these labels represent a much broader and under-researched 
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process of (de-)criminalisation shaping actor relationships, structural constraints, and issue 
salience with direct implications for negotiations. Likewise, research on conflict 
transformation has discussed the potential for negotiations to facilitate possible 
transformation whereby µparties reach new understandings of their situation¶2 and move 
towards resolving the µroot causes¶3; yet it is not particularly clear what the mechanisms are 
which brings this about. This article seeks to draw together these bodies of research to 
explore how (de)criminalisation in the context of negotiations can facilitate conflict 
transformation. The intersection between these processes is important because they initially 
appear to be in tension. By negotiating with criminalised actors the state's µhigh symbolic 
capital¶ may enhance the µnational and international¶ legitimacy of a criminalised group,4 
whereas criminalisation is inherently a process designed to delegitimise these same actors.5 
Furthermore, conflict transformation advocates for the resolution of underlying causes 
whereas negotiations often involve parties seeking to maximise their bargaining power and 
achieve the best outcome for their interests.6 Therefore understanding where these processes 
intersect is important to understand how criminalisation affects negotiations and conflict 
transformation.  
 
This article accordingly argues that criminalisation embodies an important incentive structure 
which can facilitate conflict transformation in particular contexts, but also undermines it 
depending on its target and implementation. Specifically, focusing on the criminalisation of 
nonviolent political expression, this typically impedes, or at least constrains, conflict 
transformation. This is because it undermines dialogue, dehumanises actors, and embodies 
structural constraints. Therefore conflict transformation may be facilitated through some form 
of decriminalisation; the timing and nature of which varies depending on the wider context. 
However, this needs to be qualified, because decriminalisation can contribute towards 
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intergroup polarisation, alienating actors who perceive justice as being compromised. In other 
words, what is needed for conflict transformation to occur is not necessarily decriminalisation 
or criminalisation in general, but a reorientation of criminalisation away from actors and on 
to specific acts, thereby legitimising nonviolent political expression and negotiations.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to disaggregate nonviolent political expression7 into two 
categories: (1) the criminalisation of political identity (CPI); and (2) the criminalisation of 
political activities (CPA). This is because, whilst interrelated, they can have different 
implications for negotiations. CPI is targeted against actors themselves by restricting or 
banning groups, symbols, cultural practices, or ideologies; for instance communism or 
republicanism. In contrast, CPA is targeted against political behaviours through the banning 
of protests, strikes, political meetings and publications. This focus is also important to 
distinguish the criminalisation of political expression from ordinary crime, because 
criminalising political expression collectivises an offence beyond those who commit it, both 
formally and informally, criminalising the political ideology itself and those who support it.8 
These arguments are summarised in Table I and broken down across each of the levels of 
transformation for CPI and CPA.  
 
The formal processes of criminalisation and decriminalisation are also contingent on their 
informal outworking. The criminalising of political expression frames legitimacy not simply 
through the law, but through the application of the law and its reception.9 It creates a µsocial 
reality¶10 which will be bound up in the practices of criminalisation and how these are 
perceived by those subject to them. Because of the subjective and informal nature of such a 
process, this article utilises the multilevel framework of conflict transformation to understand 
the µcomplex and evolving conflict relationships¶ which characterise peace negotiations.11  
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Table I.  Relationship between criminalisation (CPA/CPI) and negotiations across the levels 
of conflict transformation 
 Criminalisation of Identity (CPI) Criminalisation of Activity (CPA) 
Structure - Intergroup interaction is 
restricted as the communities 
associated with criminalised 
groups are alienated from the 
state. 
- Forces groups underground, 
restricting opportunities to develop 
a nonviolent political base; 
- Groups may be reluctant to engage 
in negotiations so long as they 
continue to face sanctions for 
'political' acts. 
Issue - Contributes towards issue 
polarisation along polemic 
'criminal' narratives. 
- (De-)Criminalisation embodies an 
issue itself to be negotiated in terms 
of political prisoners, reform of 
criminal justice and 
decriminalisation. 
Actor - Frames actor legitimacy for both 
state and non-state actors; 
- Contributes towards the 
dehumanisation of groups and 
embeds this across the wider 
population whereby reforms are 
perceived as giving in to 
criminality. 
- The enforcement of such 
criminalisation may alienate law 
enforcement from targeted 
communities as they are perceived 
as repressing their political identity. 
 
This is done across the three primary levels of transformation within a conflict (actor, issue, 
and structure) discussing how criminalisation constrained or facilitated transformation for 
each of these levels12. From this perspective negotiations are part of a wider process of 
transformation. This article is evaluating what impact criminalisation may have in the 
transformation of the underlying causes of violent conflict across these levels. 
 
The first section of this article will, therefore, explain the relationship between 
criminalisation and negotiations through the framework of conflict transformation. The 
6 
 
following sections will then apply this for each of the levels of conflict transformation 
through a two case comparative study of Northern Ireland and South Africa. This is 
specifically in terms of the formal negotiations leading up to the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement and the 1994 South African elections. These cases represent two typical cases of 
this mechanism where negotiations took place alongside these processes of criminalisation.13 
The variation between the two cases in terms of the extensiveness of 
criminalisation/decriminalisation enables the formal legal processes to be contrasted in 
relation to their distinct implementation and consequences (see Table II for more). Therefore, 
understanding the informal impact of criminalisation requires considering the perceptions of 
these processes, which is done by drawing on sixty-three original interviews conducted by the 
author with actors from across Northern Ireland and South Africa, including representatives 
from law enforcement, politicians, politically motivated ex-prisoners, NGOs and 
academics14. These were supplemented by a further forty-eight interviews accessed from the 
Historical Research Archive based at the University of Witwatersrand and the Mayibuye 
Archive based at the University of Western Cape. Furthermore, archival republican and 
loyalist publications, An Phoblacht and Combat respectively, were accessed from the 
Political Collection at the Linen Hall Library in Northern Ireland. The range of data sources 
enables a triangulation of perspectives to control for their validity, supplemented by 
autobiographical accounts, government documents, and academic sources. This analysis will 








Labelling crime or the crime of labelling 
 
Negotiation at its most fundamental level is a process whereby multiple actors engage in 
communication to resolve one or more issues. In the context of civil conflicts this may be 
over any number of issues, but this article is solely concerned about formal negotiations over 
a peace settlement.  )RUVXFKQHJRWLDWLRQV WREH µVXFFHVVIXO¶ IURPDFRQIOLFW WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
approach it has been argued they must address µroot causes¶,15 rather than simply the 
immediate causes of the conflict. Setting aside the challenge of identifying root causes, this 
arguably places too much responsibility on negotiations alone, and arguably a more effective 
framework would be that negotiations simply contribute towards a wider process of 
transformation. Single processes such as negotiations do not themselves complete conflict 
transformation, only contribute towards it.  
 
From this perspective, conflict transformation's multilevel framework provides µa set of 
lenses¶ through which to consider how this process - negotiations - takes effect and the 
variable impact that criminalising political expression can have on it, because µno one lens is 
capable of bringing everything into focus, we need multiple lenses to see different aspects of 
a complex reality.¶16 For each of the three levels of transformation criminalising political 
expression has a number of potential implications shaping formal negotiations, varying 
depending on their implementation as actors resist or accept them, and on their particular 
subject; whether it is CPI or CPA. Table I summarises how such interactions take place, but it 
is worth explaining first how this theoretical link is developed, before then considering it 




The structural level represents the system which embeds violent forms of conflict, where 
goals are no longer framed as incompatible, identities as polarised, and violence as the only - 
or most effective - means by which to address these.17 This often involves a redistribution of 
power between actors, addressing underlying grievances, and opening up peaceful political 
avenues to displace violent ones. Criminal justice has a considerable role in such 
transformations, in framing not only what is legitimate, but also in establishing sanctions, or 
in providing opportunities for compromise. Yet the criminalising of nonviolent political 
expression, particularly CPA, embeds a number of structural barriers to negotiations, such as 
censorship and restrictions on movement, which may require some form of decriminalisation 
before actors may be willing, or even able, to engage in negotiations. CPI embeds and 
reinforces this by restricting opportunities for intergroup dialogue as expressions of political 
identities are reduced to criminality. So long as nonstate actors face the threat of sanctions for 
nonviolent political expression, they will be unlikely to trust the state's commitment to 
negotiations.18 Accordingly, criminalised groups may be forced to operate covertly restricting 
their ability to develop a nonviolent political base or communicate their political objectives. 
 
Issue transformation involves determining which issues are more salient, moving actors away 
from conflictual positions to issues where commonality can be found.19 Criminalising 
political expression is closely linked to such issue framing, representing both an issue itself in 
terms of CPI, and a mechanism through which issues are framed because of CPA. Firstly the 
reverse of such criminalisation - decriminalisation - may be used as a bargaining tool to 
incentivise movement on other issues. The implications of such decriminalisation, however, 
are contingent on their informal outworking, as, although actors may be granted some form of 
formal pardon or amnesty, this will not address the embedded discourse of the criminal 
narrative. Whilst decriminalisation, whatever its form, may address the structural issues 
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described above, it will be unlikely to address informal criminalisation. Specifically for 
negotiations this means that decriminalisation will be interpreted differently across the 
various actors, fostering agreement and trust with some, whilst isolating others. This links 
into the second point, whereby the salience of the criminal 'issue' will frame how 
decriminalisation actually takes effect, as polemic criminal narratives determine how actors 
perceive the negotiation process itself. When group identities are labelled as criminal, this 
frames intergroup identities into dichotomies like victim/perpetrator.20 Negotiations in such 
contexts are defined by these identities, with actors framing their positions along these 
polarised lines - for example that they will not negotiate with terrorists. This is because 
nDUUDWLYHV RI YLFWLPLVDWLRQ WHQG WR µPLQLPLVH WKH FRQWH[W DQG H[WHQG WKH WLPH IUDPH RI WKH
event IRUZDUG DQG EDFNZDUG LQ WLPH¶, whereas perpetrators WHQG WR µDWWULEXWH WKH HYHQW WR
RXWVLGHFDXVHVPLQLPL]HWKHLPSDFWRQWKHYLFWLPDQGVHHWKHHYHQWDVDPRPHQWLQWLPH¶21. 
Consequently, issues under negotiation will be defined by the label - terrorist or criminal - 
and so a polarised label will lead to polarised ways of addressing them.22 This can be 
problematic for negotiations, as issues under negotiation are embedded in a zero-sum 
framework, so some reframing of these identities away from criminals or terrorists towards 
political actors may help facilitate the development of trust and dialogue.23  
 
The transformation of actors refers to changes in leadership, goals, or power relations 
between groups in such a way that will change the nature of the conflict itself.24 Whilst this 
may involve a change in the actors themselves, criminalisation primarily impacts actors in 
terms of how they are perceived: their framing. CPI frames their political ideologies as 
illegitimate and polarises intergroup relations, determining which actors are deemed 
legitimate or not. This relates to both the state and nonstate actors, as an oppressive criminal 
justice system may undermine the legitimacy of the state within certain communities, whilst 
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the state's criminal framing may likewise undermine nonstate actors.25 Secondly, CPI reduces 
actors to simple characterisations as the criminal other, effectively de-humanising individuals 
and groups, rather than recognising their inherent emotional, political, and social identities.26 
These characterisations vary considerably between and within cases because they are 
contingent on the communities whom actors derive support from and their relationship with 
the state. It is through the enforcement of CPA that such characterisations become realised. 
The legitimacy of criminal justice will therefore depend on this implementation. 
 
Individually each of these levels identifies specific ways the criminalisation of political 
expression may impact upon negotiations which, when brought together, illustrate the 
complexity of the relationship. This article is not seeking to resolve these complexities, but 
merely consider their development and potential implications for negotiations. Taking 
conflict as an opportunity, and viewing negotiations as an important mechanism of 
transformation, conflict transformation provides an effective framework through which to 
consider the complexities of criminalisation through the case studies of Northern Ireland and 
South Africa. The two cases are themselves distinct with respect to the level of 
criminalisation, but both provide typical examples of how CPI and CPA may operate in the 
context of negotiations. Table II summarises these issues in relation to the two case studies. 










Table II. Comparison of CPI/CPA between Northern Ireland and South Africa in relation 
to negotiations 
 Criminalisation of Identity 
(CPI) 





- Proscription or restricting of 
certain cultural symbols 
(i.e. flags and emblems). 
- Censorship of Sinn Fein. 
South 
Africa 
- Most political organisations 
opposed to the state were 
banned. 
- Meetings, publications, and 





- Political (nonviolent) 
republicanism and loyalism 
delegitimised as criminal 
because of links with 
paramilitaries. 
- Decriminalisation embodied 
a crucial issue itself to be 
negotiated in terms of 
political prisoners and the 
reform of criminal justice. 
South 
Africa 
- Communism label used to 





- Linkages between political 
groups and violent 
counterparts embedded the 
terrorism/criminal label for 
both. 
- Law enforcement perceived 
as a unionist institution and 




- De-humanisation of groups 
through the communist 
label. 
- Non-whites and anti-state 
activists feared the use of 








Structural transformation: Criminalisation as a barrier or enabler 
 
Criminalising political groups 
 
South Africa prior to the formal negotiations which began in 1990 represents a context in 
which there was widespread criminalisation of political expression. At this time it was illegal 
to be a member of any proscribed group, communicate their political views, meet together, 
finance, or support in any form, punishable with custodial sentences.27 For this reason the 
African National Congress (ANC) made the unbanning of itself alongside other political 
groups - the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) 
- a non-negotiable prerequisite to formal negotiations as it was considered a clear and 
unassailable impediment. For example, µfrom around late 1986 onwards¶ almost every 
uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) operative entering South Africa from Zimbabwe was allegedly 
µkilled or arrested within 24 hours.¶28 The ANC vocalised their position in the Harare 
Declaration where they put forward their preconditions for entering into formal negotiations 
with the National Party (NP). It explained that the ANC would go on ceasefire if the State 
ended the state of emergency, released political prisoners, de-proscribed political 
organisations, and withdrew troops from black townships.29 The fear of being arrested, 
imprisoned, or otherwise punished was an ever-present reality for ANC negotiators. Mandela 
explained their rationale in his response to being offered conditional release if the MK went 
on ceasefire: µWhat freedom am I being offered while the organisation of the people remains 
banned...What freedom am I being offered when my very South African citizenship is not 
respected? Only free men can negotiate. Prisoners cannot enter into contracts.¶30 So long as 
nonstate actors face the threat of imprisonment they will face issues of credible commitment 




Entering negotiations incurs a risk for these groups, so unless they trust that they will not end 
up imprisoned, or otherwise sanctioned - that they can be sure they will survive their µinitial 
vulnerability¶ - they will be unlikely to engage in negotiations.31 This is particularly relevant 
when conflicts are protracted, as actors will be even less likely to trust their opponents,32 and 
criminalising political activities presents one mechanism through which this distrust becomes 
embedded. The very structure of criminal justice was designed to engage with these groups as 
criminals, not as political actors. Indeed, when announcing the reversal of the proscription of 
these groups De Klerk implied as much - even whilst he denied such an implication - stating: 
µThe unconditional lifting of the prohibition on the said organisations places everybody in a 
position to pursue politics freely¶33 The inference being that previously the liberation 
organisations had been unable to pursue politics freely because of the criminal sanctions and 
restrictions.  
 
But decriminalisation also served a more pragmatic end, as it facilitated a re-balancing of 
power relations between the ANC and the National Party whereby µANC leaders could 
legitimise the move to negotiation in terms of its position of strength.34 De-proscription 
enabled the ANC to raise awareness of its political position in white communities, as 
previously censorship had meant many still viewed them as a criminal organisation.35 These 
limitations are, however, contingent upon their implementation; although they can restrict a 
group's voice on a national level, this may not be the case for intra-group or external 
communication. It can actually force groups to externalise their voice by developing an 
international communicative strategy as happened in both of these cases; in the anti-




Removing the criminal sanction began the process of challenging intergroup characterisations 
opening up opportunities for dialogue where previous criminalisation had closed them off. 
Conflict transformation was, therefore, partially facilitated through this transformation of 
criminalisation as the structural barriers embodied in the criminal sanctions were addressed, 
and as new opportunities emerged for nonviolent political expression.  
 
Conversely in Northern Ireland negotiations took place without any formal decriminalisation 
of political groups, but this was because the British government had not formally criminalised 
political organisations, as had been the case in South Africa. Whilst the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and (after 1992) the Ulster Defence Association 
(UDA) were all criminalised, the communities they represented also had political, nonviolent 
organisations to which each of these proscribed groups were unofficially affiliated: Sinn Fein, 
the Progressive Unionist Party, and the Ulster Democratic Party.37 Not criminalising those 
engaged in political violence would have potentially risked the state being viewed as weak, or 
resulted in a more repressive militarised response, but by limiting it to violent groups this 
kept open important political channels.38 Nonviolent political groups were not only legal, but 
they also had varying electoral mandates, providing a legitimate alternative to political 
violence. These groups provided the British government with alternatives to terrorist groups, 
meaning they could enter into negotiations without the same backlash associated with 
audience costs.39 For instance, an IRA ex-prisoner explained: µ[T]hey didn't need to de-
proscribe the IRA in order to have negotiations, because they could negotiate with Sinn Fein 
and that was the way around it¶40 Peaceful political expression was not restricted in the same 
way it was in South Africa in terms of having political representation enabling groups to 
enter negotiations without formally being decriminalised. Yet this does not preclude that a 
form of secret parallel negotiations took place with the paramilitaries, albeit often indirectly, 
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and indeed had done so periodically since the 1970s.41 These back-channel contacts were 
particularly important in the context of such criminalisation because they µpermit negotiation 
on the question of legitimacy without conceding legitimacy¶; taking effect similarly in South 




Whilst political activities were not criminalised to the same extent in Northern Ireland, there 
were still restrictions on political expression in terms of censorship, evident in the censorship 
of Sinn Fein publications and public statements from 1988 until the IRA ceasefire in 1994.43 
This was done through the broadcasting ban whereby the British Government censored 
political expression of both illegal and some legal organisations. Instead of engaging with the 
men and women responsible for continuing violence, censorship µdemonised¶ them and their 
organisation so that sections of the public were not really aware of their political goals.44 This 
was problematic for conflict transformation because whilst many rejected the political 
violence of the IRA, a significant proportion of the Catholic population shared at least some 
of the political aspirations of Sinn Fein.45 Mitchell McLaughlin, the former General Secretary 
of Sinn Fein, explained: µ[The British Government] silenced the voice of controversy so that 
all you got was a kind of a monologue¶46  Resisting this then took the form of murals and 
other symbols, as an IRA ex-prisoner described: µ[G]raffiti...was important at the time 
because the state were in total control of all other expressions of citizenship¶47 Therefore, 
decriminalising political activities was important for conflict transformation in terms of 
legitimising dialogue as an alternative to political violence. But it played a further - perhaps 





Following the 1994 IRA ceasefire the British Government decided to end the broadcasting 
ban. Previously censorship had been justified on the basis of criminalising ongoing political 
violence,48 but once a ceasefire was announced, amongst other contextual factors like Gerry 
Adams¶ visit to the USA, it became politically problematic to maintain. Criminalisation's role 
in constraining negotiations was supplanted by wider political pressures domestically and 
internationally. This meant that those involved in the negotiations would be able to 
communicate their positions openly ending years of censorship. So whilst CPI and CPA can 
be in tension with dialogue and negotiations, its reform is contingent upon the state's ability 
and willingness to separate peaceful or legitimate political activities - providing the means for 
this to take place - from violent or illegitimate alternatives. 
 
 
Issue transformation: Criminality or political identity  
 
Criminalisation as a bargaining issue 
 
Criminalisation serves an important role as an issue itself, not simply in its ability to frame 
issues, but acting as an incentive structure shaping negotiations. The state will usually have 
imprisoned a number of political actors representing a barrier to negotiations as described 
above, but on the other hand its reversal has the potential to foster trust and provide 
considerable movement on other issues. For instance in Northern Ireland prisoner releases 
were used strategically as a bargaining chip by the British Government µto try and prise 
concessions from the two sides¶; a third of the discussions during the initial meetings between 
the paramilitaries and the British Government were focussed on prison and prisoner issues.49 
17 
 
Likewise, republicans had resisted criminalisation since its inception, and so shortly after the 
1994 IRA ceasefire Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams called for the abandonment of µthe 
whole range of repressive legislation¶ and the release of all political prisoners.50 In the same 
way the republican publication An Phoblacht [Republican News] later published a list of all 
µIrish Republican Political Hostages¶ calling for their release.51 Indeed a comparative study 
completed by the Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders 
(NIACRO) in 1995 concluded that: µ[W]e would argue that, until the question of prisoners is 
agreed then nothing, that will create a final solution, is agreed¶52 Such was the prominence of 
political prisoners as a key issue in the negotiations that if not properly addressed the 
likelihood for a sustainable peace agreement would greatly diminish. Similarly, for loyalists 
µa review of prison sentences would have been a way to counter the overall perception that 
there has been no real movement¶53 For these reasons the key security legislation - the 
Emergency Powers Act and Prevention of Terrorism Act - were repealed on 25 August 1996 
and 19 February 2001 respectively, and rules on remission were revised.54  Such concessions 
signalled a willingness to reach a mutually acceptable agreement contributing towards inter-
party trust in the negotiations. 
 
This prioritisation of decriminalisation is not surprising considering the key role which 
prisoners played in the negotiations themselves. For example in 1997, following the 
assassination of Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) leader Billy Wright, the UDA prisoners took 
a vote in prison and two thirds voted against the peace process. The significance of the vote is 
evident in how both Ulster Unionist Party leader, David Trimble, and later the Secretary of 





Similarly in South Africa prisoner releases were used to facilitate trust and encourage 
dialogue; beginning with the unbanning of political groups and the releases of certain 
individuals. In announcing these changes De Klerk explained: µWith the steps the 
Government has taken it has proven its good faith.¶56 Over the course of the negotiations 
during 1990-91 indemnity was granted to various categories of offenders; sentences were 
shortened for others; and others were simply released with no clear legal justification.57 The 
NP also had serious concerns over state actors being taken to court over past actions under 
the Apartheid regime evident in the Further Indemnity Act 151 (1992), which De Klerk 
argued was µto level the playing field between the government and opposition group¶58 So 
not only was the issue of political prisoners under considerable negotiation, but so to were 
amnesties. Eventually the debate moved towards the proposal that became realised in the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, of conditional amnesties granted in exchange for truth 
recovery. So whilst concessions on decriminalisation can build trust acting as µa radical new 
political opportunity structure¶, they also embody a narrative µbattlefield¶, as actors on all 
sides seek to legitimise their narrative through decriminalisation.59 Conflict transformation in 
this sense is constrained by the inter-party bargaining dynamics. But the role it has in 





Whilst decriminalisation can be used as a bargaining issue facilitating movement at the 
negotiation table, this must be understood in the context of its implications beyond the 
negotiators themselves. The framing of nonstate actors as criminals or terrorists contributes 
towards a narrative of conflict which denies the political legitimacy of the actors involved. 
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This means that criminalisation functions as µone of the many ways to construct social 
reality¶,60 and so polarises political actors along polemic lines embedding fundamentally 
divergent perspectives. This is problematic for conflict transformation in respect of CPI and 
CPA, because it delegitimises not only nonviolent political expression, but also the political 
ideology and actors themselves.  
 
Decriminalisation may, therefore, be perceived as both a mechanism facilitating a transition 
towards peace by some, whilst simultaneously as acquiescing to criminality by others. 
Indeed, decriminalising political identity can exacerbate intergroup relations, as those within 
the state's communal group may perceive it as giving into terrorism or criminality, directly 
relating to the role of audience costs associated with criminalisation.61 This is because one of 
the fundamental reasons behind such criminalisation, the delegitimising a political group, 
becomes problematic when the state decides to reform it. Referring to these pro-state actors 
and their perspective, the Director of the Committee on the Administration of Justice, Brian 
Gormally, explained: µ[T]here were those who supported the policy of criminalisation, who 
see law as a weapon against this terrorist criminality, and reforms undermine this view¶62 
Indeed an IRA ex-prisoner implied the challenge this presented to the negotiations stating: 
µLuckily for us whenever we were doing the heavy lifting in the negotiations it wasn't with 
the unionists, it was with the British¶63 Criminalisation itself was only one mechanism 
contributing towards the de-legitimisation of these actors; others - not least political violence 
- make it difficult to deduce precisely its direct implications on intergroup narrative. But at 
the very least it had a significant role as its reversal ± decriminalisation - was seen by some to 
be selling out justice for peace; letting 'criminals' get away with their crimes. Hazlett Lynch, a 
former project co-ordinator with the victims' group for security force personnel called West 
Tyrone Voice, explained that he felt certain individuals are µabove the law¶64 and a 
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community worker of a victims and survivors NGO explained how many are asking: µHow 
much more do we need [to give up] to buy peace?¶65 By bargaining the ability to prosecute, 
or for lower sentences, it gives rise to perceptions of justice being compromised for at least 
some individuals. Indeed this decriminalisation process will be constrained by a wider 
discursive battleground as each side seeks to legitimise its own position.  
 
This was echoed in South Africa where individuals raised frustration over an elite-driven 
approach resulting in many historical crimes going unaddressed. Majorie Jobson, Director of 
the victims' organisation Khulumani, explained: µThe reason the state won't pursue these 
prosecutions of Apartheid criminals is that they've got too much to hide themselves¶66 The 
perception is that justice for state crimes was traded away, whereas many of those who were 
criminalised under the Apartheid system continue to suffer the consequences in terms of 
trauma and widespread poverty. Whilst the challenge of addressing such issues should not be 
underestimated, many feel that the task has never been properly acknowledged, and so will 
never be addressed: µ[...] the people who've carried all the sacrifices and damage [are unable] 
to get a foothold in the economy; as a result, you can just be ignored¶67 Decriminalisation, 
therefore, can have serious long-term implications, especially on the post-settlement phase, 
and actually undermine conflict transformation in the long-term.68 
 
 






As explained in the introduction, there is considerable debate around the importance of 
legitimacy for negotiations, particularly in relation to terrorism69, but for actor transformation 
this legitimacy needs to be understood as an interactive process. For on the one hand 
criminalising political expression is often explicitly about delegitimising the target; ruling out 
any form of formal dialogue because from the state's perspective. Brian Gormally explained, 
referring to the state's rationale: µ[Y]ou don't negotiate with criminals, you subject them to the 
criminal law¶70 The state will use criminalisation to legitimise itself, contrasting its 'legal' 
practices with those of the criminalised. For example the Minister of Justice in South Africa 
stated, when announcing the Terrorism Act: µWe are not going to reply to their violent assault 
with machine guns, but are going to try them in our courts in accordance with the norms of a 
civilised community¶71 Likewise, in announcing the introduction of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act, the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins stated: µThese powers...are Draconian. In 
combination they are unprecedented in peacetime. I believe they are fully justified to meet 
the clear and present danger¶72 Because of the µcampaign of indiscriminate murder¶ these 
powers were deemed necessary to µprotect the innocent public¶73 
 
Yet by using the criminal justice system in this way, it can develop or reinforce the state's 
illegitimacy for those subject to it.  This is because µthe state can only confer legitimacy upon 
an entity for itself¶74 so it is often unable to extend it beyond this, and may actually 
contribute towards the reverse. Whilst the state may label a nonstate actor µFULPLQDO¶ WR
delegitimise them, its impact will be contingent on the enforcement of this labelling and the 
wider legitimacy the state holds. This is particularly problematic when linking a political 
identity to a criminal narrative, as it informally criminalises those communities which 




Consider how in Northern Ireland the legitimacy of the state was contested from its inception 
by many of those from within the republican community. An IRA ex-prisoner explained: 
µThe justice system was already undermined from the foundation of the state because we saw 
this as the Orange state¶76 From this perspective the criminalising of political expression was 
regarded simply as a µweapon in >WKHVWDWH¶V@ arsenal to defeat...the republican movement.¶77 
Rather than delegitimising these actors it was perceived as µcorrupting the judicial process¶ 
because it µcriminalised an entire community¶78 Loyalist paramilitaries similarly rejected the 
label of criminalisation but from a different perspective, as they regarded the state as 
legitimate, but it was the enforcement of criminalisation and its denial of their identity which 
they rejected. For instance a UVF ex-prisoner explained how such criminalisation µwas to 
strip you of any identity¶ and that the practices of security personnel µundermined my sort of 
view of my own state and the police¶79 Likewise another UVF ex-prisoner stated: µthe 
problem that I see was that they tried to treat the conflict as a massive crime wave and...what 
they succeeded in doing was corrupting the criminal justice system¶80 What is interesting is 
how similarly those criminalised in South Africa regarded the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system, as an MK ex-prisoner explained: µThe justice system of this country under 
Apartheid was rotten and controlled by the military¶ later going on to say µin this country 
there was no justice¶81 Another former political prisoner echoed this stating: µWe didn't even 
in a sense think about...whether [political violence] was legitimate or not; this state was 
illegitimate¶82 As was the case for republican and loyalist paramilitary groups in Northern 
Ireland, the criminal label held no legitimacy and actually served to embed state illegitimacy.  
 
For negotiations legitimising both the state and nonstate actors may, therefore, require some 
form of decriminalisation, formal and informal. In South Africa this was enabled partially by 
the ending of the Cold War, as terrorism had nearly always been expressed in terms of the 
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Communist threat. The NP needed some way to 'sell' decriminalisation, as 58% of the white 
population opposed government-ANC negotiations as reported in a survey from 1988.83 
Therefore the decline of Communism was fortuitous, as noted by Justice Minister Kobie 
Coetsee, as µan opportunity to normalise¶84 enabling the NP to frame decriminalisation as the 
result of the decline of communism: the ANC was no longer the µcommunist threat¶ it had 
been. Displacing the communist characterisation of CPI facilitated the humanisation of the 
ANC and other groups, as they were no longer defined principally by the single criminalised 
ideology, but by their wider political goals and objectives. This in turn complemented the 
negotiation process as Pik Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, explained: µ[P]eople 
did get to know each other for the first time as human beings, as fellow South Africans [and] 
that their struggle from their point of view [was] driven also by their love for their country.85 
Instead of characterising those across the table as communists, their political objectives were 
defined in their own terms, as Botha continued: µThis is also their country and not just a 
country for the whites. They want a fair share in it¶"86 Reframing identities contributed 
towards this building of empathy and shared understanding which are both understood to be 
important foundations for conflict transformation. 
 
In Northern Ireland this reframing was more problematic because the links between political 
republicanism and loyalism and the 'terrorist' or 'criminal' elements were perceived as 
intertwined, and in some ways were.87 If any of the illegal organisations had been de-
proscribed it may have been perceived as legitimising political violence across both 
communities, alienating many especially within unionist political parties who would have 
regarded such a concession as a sign of acquiescing to criminality and terrorism, a pattern 
which is common for most proscribed groups.88 An IRA ex-prisoner referred to this stating: 
µIn terms of negotiations...the British obviously had to keep them very secret because they 
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couldn't be seen to be speaking to people they were labelling as terrorists.¶89 This is indicative 
of the challenge criminalising politics embeds; framing political activities as criminal and 
embedding this over decades not only impacts elite discourse and policy, but also intergroup 
perceptions throughout communities.90 Another IRA ex-prisoner explained: µYou even heard 
political leaders talking about periods of decontamination and the need to be housetrained.¶91 
Because of the embeddedness of the criminal identity, the 'housetraining' of actors refers as 
much to the normalisation of republican politicians as it does their renunciation of violence.  
 
This is why decriminalisation is the focus as opposed to de-proscription specifically; the 
latter proffers a contextually-bound proscriptive solution, whereas decriminalisation allows 
for a much wider range of options. The formal de-proscription of a group will not necessarily 
reverse the informal perception of that group as criminal as it does not need to be accepted, 
whereas an informal decriminalisation requires much more comprehensive transformation 
and support from the bottom-up. For instance there could be a more informal process of un-
labelling these groups in order to facilitate trust and re-legitimise nonviolent republicanism. 
For instance the Northern Ireland Office Political Director at the time, Quentin Thomas, 
explained that the process of negotiations itself 'de-demonised' Sinn Fein beyond the 
republican community.92 Negotiations conferred a level of legitimacy on to the political 
credentials of these actors. Yet it was balanced with the continuing criminalisation of their 
violent counterparts in the IRA, UDA and UVF. Instead of reversing the political discourse of 
criminalisation, a half-way measure was pursued to balance the political divide whereby the 
political elements within these groups were given legal means to express their identity, whilst 




Such legitimisation affected loyalist paramilitaries differently from republicans, as many 
within unionist and loyalist communities continued to view them as illegitimate.93 Whilst 
some loyalist communities viewed the paramilitaries with some legitimacy, for many it was 
the police and army who represented the legitimate defenders of their community, with 
paramilitaries being viewed as undermining the rule of law. For instance a unionist politician 
explained: µ[Y]ou grew up to respect...law and order...and that's why the UDA, which had at 
one time 50,000 people, couldn't get anybody elected¶94 The relative legitimacy that loyalist 
paramilitaries held, therefore, did not necessarily translate into electoral support. Whilst the 
reasons behind this are complex, the implications are quite clear, as a senior UDA ex-prisoner 
explained: µYou know we're there for a specific thing. We're there to do the dirty work. We're 
the skeletons in the cupboard. But it's the suit and the tie that they vote for and that's the way 
it's always been.95  However, this was not the case for all in these communities as certain 
unionist actors had a very uneasy relationship with the police. This was evident for instance 
around the Anglo-Irish accord, and then again at the Drumcree protests. Indeed in some 
communities loyalist actors developed an electoral mandate, evident in the support for the 
Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party.96 Actor transformation through 
informal decriminalisation, therefore, varied considerably across unionist and loyalist 
communities. For instance, a UDA ex-prisoner referred to how such criminalisation still 
continues even today informally in the media and political discourse: µWhat's happening here 
and now is the criminalisation of individuals that were involved in that political struggle, to 
de-legitimise their future going forward, so they don't have a future¶97 Transforming the 
political identities of actors was complex and variable, demonstrating how the impact of 





Balancing these issues of legitimacy is crucial for the wider legitimisation of criminal justice 
following a negotiated settlement in fostering the buy-in of the main political groups. 
Decriminalising nonviolent political expression resolves a number of fundamental formal 
barriers, but must also be accompanied by the informal support of communities. Without 
entering the debate within transitional justice over how such re-legitimisation should take 
place, in terms of negotiations there is an important link between building support for 
decriminalising nonviolent political expression and the re-legitimisation of the criminal 
justice system. The challenge, which is beyond the scope of this article, is how do you then 
ensure this elite level narrative is translated down through to the communities they represent, 
and on the other hand, how you reconcile the old narrative with the new without alienating 
large sections of the state? These are questions for further research, but this article provides 





This article has discussed the potential implications which the criminalisation of nonviolent 
political expression can have on negotiations, and consequently for conflict transformation. It 
argued that the processes of criminalisation and decriminalisation embody important 
incentive structures affecting peace negotiations, and that for conflict transformation to 
effectively occur criminalisation needs to be orientated away from a criminalisation of actors 
and on to specific acts; thereby legitimising nonviolent political expression and negotiations.  
 
These arguments relate to the particular nature of criminalisation, because its implications 
depend on its target and implementation. By distinguishing the criminalisation of political 
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identity (CPI) from the criminalisation of political activities (CPA) these implications begin 
to become clearer. Table I outlines these distinctions across the levels of conflict 
transformation, and Table II maps them across the two case studies.  Specifically, CPA 
appears to function as a barrier to peace negotiations, as nonstate actors will fear possible 
sanctions, and be forced to operate covertly, distrusting the state's commitment to dialogue. 
These issues then come to embody bargaining issues, themselves to be negotiated, but if left 
unaddressed, their enforcement will likely contribute to the greater alienation of the state 
from within targeted communities. Similarly, CPI may undermine the negotiations by 
polarising intergroup identities into oppositional categories. Identities are reduced to simple 
characterisations which frame political beliefs and ideologies as criminality or terrorism. This 
polarisation displaces underlying political objectives, embedding negotiations into zero-sum 
terms which de-humanise participants and limit the potential for a stable agreement. 
Therefore, from a policy perspective, criminalising political expression in a civil conflict 
presents a serious challenge for formal negotiations to take place. It compounds the credible 
commitment of the state, creates information breakdown, and increases audience costs 
associated with political compromise, effectively increasing the costs of negotiations for both 
the state and nonstate actors. These are very general points because of the inherently complex 
processes under discussion, but they provide at least an initial theoretical framework for 
considering this complexity. 
 
In many ways these findings are intuitive; that by criminalising nonviolent political 
expression the state restricts opportunities for negotiation. But the implications of this are of 
great importance for conflict transformation. Table III summarises a number of ways 
(de)criminalisation can facilitate conflict transformation which follow from the discussion 
above. Instead of arguing for a binary reliance on criminalisation or decriminalisation, the 
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findings suggest that the two processes can complement one another if orientated away from 
actors and on to actions. In other words, decriminalising nonviolent political expression (both 
CPI and CPA) can open up opportunities for negotiation, and reorienting criminalisation on 
to violent acts delegitimises violence as an alternative to negotiation. But this central 




(De)criminalisation as a mechanism of conflict transformation 
Structure 
Transformation 
- Decriminalise nonviolent political activities to remove the structural 
barriers they represent for negotiations; removing the deterrent of 
sanctions, and the restrictions on communication and nonviolent 
mobilisation; 
- 2SHQ XS LQWHUJURXS SROLWLFDO GLDORJXH WR DGGUHVV µFULPLQDO¶
characterisations both at the elite level and at the grassroots. 
Issue 
Transformation 
- Decriminalising political identity to re-humanise groups so that they 
are no longer defined solely by their 'crimes', but by their political 
objectives; 
- Use decriminalisation to build trust between groups and a willingness 
to reach a mutually beneficial agreement; 
- Negotiate an intergroup policy of criminalising political violence to 
ensure the buy-in of all (or at least most) parties. 
Actor 
Transformation 
- Decriminalise political groups so that they can openly engage in 
nonviolent political dialogue; 
- Maintain the criminalisation of violent acts to delegitimise it as a form 
of political expression; 
- Transition away from using criminal justice to delegitimise political 
actors, and seek to develop political support for these institutions. 
 
The comparison between the two cases was important, as it unpacked how the variation in the 
nature of criminalisation may constrain its implications for conflict transformation. For 
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instance in South Africa decriminalising political groups was regarded as a non-negotiable 
prerequisite to negotiations because of the oppressiveness of sanctions and extensiveness of 
restrictions on political expression, whereas in Northern Ireland political groups were 
generally able to operate with greater freedom, as nonviolent groups were not formally 
criminalised - albeit there were some restrictions in terms of censorship. In other words, so 
long as there are viable and favourable alternatives to political violence, the importance of 
criminalising political expression will likely diminish. Furthermore, the variation across pro- 
and anti- state groups in Northern Ireland illustrates the contingency of criminalisation upon 
the communities it seeks to impact. Pro-state communities will be much more inclined to 
incorporate and accept the state narrative of criminalisation due to the legitimacy they ascribe 
to law and order, whereas communities alienated from the state may view it as a further 
intrusion on their identity. This means criminalisation needs to be regarded not simply as a 
legal top-down process, but also as a bottom-up one. For conflict transformation, therefore, 
the above reorientation will depend on the bottom-up buy-in of communities; otherwise the 
reorientation itself might be resisted by those who accepted the prior status quo. 
 
For further research it would be important to consider whether these findings are 
generalisable beyond Northern Ireland and South Africa. Although these cases are illustrative 
and provide an important contribution to our understanding of negotiations and conflict 
transformation, they are temporally and contextually bound to the 1990s. Further research 
into contrasting cases beyond this would be necessary to see if the arguments apply to 
contemporary cases. Furthermore, the focus on nonviolent political expression was necessary 
for the coherence and scope of this article, but research into criminalising political violence 
and the interaction between nonviolent and violent political expression would be an important 
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 For instance a senior UDA ex-prisoner stated: 'I've no doubt there are people within loyalist paramilitaries 
who have always been criminals if you like under a flag of convenience' (UDA ex-prisoner A, 2016); a UVF ex-
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